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The memories of a great tragedy linger here.  And for 
all who knew loss here, life is not the same.  The 184 
whose lives were taken in this place – veterans and 
recruits, soldiers and civilians, husbands and wives, 
parents and children – left behind family and friends 
whose loss cannot be weighed.  The murder of 
innocents cannot be explained, only endured.  And 
though they died in tragedy, they did not die in vain. . . 
Their loss has moved a nation to action in a cause to 
defend other innocent lives across the world. 
 
 
 
 
— President George Bush at the Pentagon 
September 11, 2002  
 
 
 
We have seen the images so many times, they are 
seared on our souls.  And remembering the horror, 
reliving the anguish, re-imagining the terror is hard 
and painful.  For all Americans it has been a year of 
adjustment, of coming to terms with the difficult 
knowledge that our nation has determined enemies, 
and that we are not invulnerable to their attacks. . . .  
We resolved a year ago to honor every last person 
lost.  We owe them remembrance, and we owe them 
more.  We owe them and their children and our own 
the most enduring monument we can build:  a world 
of liberty and security, made possible by the way 
America leads and by the way Americans lead our 
lives. 
 
 
 
 
— President George Bush at Ellis Island 
September 11, 2002 
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1 
 
What is striking about these two passages from otherwise generic 
speeches is the movement in them from emotional identification to 
collective action, from memory of tragedy to national mobilization 
for war.  Horror, anguish, and the struggle to measure a “loss that 
cannot be weighed” are invoked as the coalescence of a unified 
national will to vengeance.  The transition happens so quickly that 
dissenters from the buildup to war easily become confused with 
people who have no sympathy for the grief of those who lost loved 
ones in the terrorist attacks.  There is no separation between grief 
and policy, emotion and reason here.  The only way to adjust 
appropriately to the shock of U.S. vulnerability is to resolve to act 
against those that targeted us for terror.  Any other adjustment – 
for example, the desire to study the history of U. S.  foreign policy 
to discover what abuses have generated the terrorists’ desperation 
– is suspect. 
 
 
2 
 
As social philosopher Dominick LaCapra has noted, “When 
absence is converted into loss, one increases the likelihood of 
misplaced nostalgia or utopian politics in quest of a new totality or 
fully unified community” (1999, p. 698).  In this sense, the politics 
of war offered by President Bush on the anniversary of the 
September 11, 2002 attacks hastily convert absence into loss in 
order to construct a fully unified national community.  LaCapra 
adds, “This conflation tends to take place so rapidly that it escapes 
notice and seems natural or necessary.  Yet, among other 
questionable consequences, it threatens to convert subsequent 
accounts  into displacements of the story of original sin wherein a 
prelapsarian state of unity or identity – whether real or fictive – is 
understood as giving way through a fall to difference and conflict.  
It also typically involves the tendency to avoid addressing 
historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms” 
(p. 700). 
 
 
3 
 
As I argued in my book Control and Consolation  in American 
Culture and Politics (1998), there are important imbrications of 
the therapeutic, nationalism, and affect in U. S.  public culture.  In 
a chapter on the war of emotions during the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, I wrote, “During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. television news 
played a key role in domesticating dissent by rearticulating 
political outrage as personal anxiety and reconfiguring the will to 
resist as the need to support our troops.  The mobilization of the 
themes and language of psychological crisis and emotional support 
domesticated the home front because images of families quietly 
coping with the treat of war served as the key icon for the 
manufacturers of appropriate public response. . . .  During the war, 
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the American nation was itself figured as a unitary body – the body 
anti-politic – in need of comfort and reassurance” (pp. 85-86).  
Since September 11, 2001, this rhetoric of national therapy has re-
emerged with a vengeance, defining an American public in terms 
of emotional support and consolation rather than political 
deliberation, debate, or weighing of alternatives to war based on 
in-depth knowledge and critical thinking. 
 
 
 Muffling Academic Speech in Emotion  
 
4 
 
At the University of Texas, where I teach, the voices of progressive 
faculty were smothered in the thick consolatory space of mourning 
that followed September’s terrorist attacks.  Several days after the 
attacks, journalism professor Bob Jensen published an op-ed in 
the Houston Chronicle (2001).  Jensen argued that if we found the 
indiscriminate targeting of civilians to be beyond justification on 
U.S. soil, we should also find it to be so in Afghanistan, where U.S. 
bombs killed more tan 3000 civilians, according to some estimates 
(Milne 2001).  In response to Jensen’s editorial, the President of 
the University of Texas, Larry Faulkner, published a scathing 
response in the Chronicle (2001).  Faulkner’s letter, apparently 
provoked by a great deal of negative mail regarding Jensen’s piece, 
attacked Jensen as a “disgusting” “undiluted fountain of 
foolishness” whom no one takes seriously anyway. 
 
 
5 
 
Many of us among the progressive faculty found this public 
denunciation of a member of Faulkner’s own faculty to be quite 
chilling.  Faulkner’s letter was an emotional diatribe that did not 
respond meaningfully to the arguments and evidence Jensen’s 
writing presented.  Rather, Faulkner cast Jensen out of the 
University community, designating his own employee as outside 
the fold.  Interestingly other faculty and alumni shared Faulkner’s 
view on the basis of defining community in emotional terms after 
September 11.  The Chair of the Faculty Council, for example, told 
me that he thought Jensen was right to raise questions, but he 
should have waited a respectable number of days or weeks before 
violating the bubble of mourning.  It was unclear in his remarks 
how long one should wait, as a nation prepares for and executes a 
war, to raise questions of life and death. 
 
 
6 
 
In the summer after the attacks, I published an alternative pledge 
of allegiance in the University of Texas student newspaper (Cloud 
2002a; see Appendix).  My version of the pledge omitted 
subservience to God and articulated solidarity with ordinary 
people around the world, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
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Palestine.  This attempt at critical-rational intervention into public 
discussion was met almost univocally by emotional responses by 
fax, email, and phone.  Most of them – hundreds of them – were 
angry and hate filled.  Under the heading “Eat a Bag of Shit,” 
someone wrote, “How about I print this out and shove it up your 
ass when I visit Austin in August?”  Another critical thinker replied 
with name-calling:  “Wow, are you a typical liberal jackass?”  Still 
another expressed fear and threatened my physical safety:  “You 
are a scary woman.  Scary in the sense that you might reach one 
student with pro terrorist and communist leanings.  A heads up to 
you, comrade, liberalism and communism died on 9/11.  Your 
email was posted on a very popular website; expect major backlash 
over your manifesto of America hatred.  If you hate America so 
much, why not move to Indonesia, Palestine or one of the other 
countries you listed?  It would be a good first start, covering your 
face with a burka [sic].  You should be ashamed of yourself.” 
 
7 
 
Some responses were gendered and sexualized.  With the subject 
head “Lesbo Butch,” a person wrote, “Dear Butch:  I feel sorry for 
you.  What a warped view of things you have.  But I'm sure you 
think you are “enlightened.”  If you hate America so much, hike up 
your skirts and head for the border.  Go somewhere and start a 
marxist, atheist, lesbo-feminist commune.  Please.”  It is striking in 
my correspondence that my detractors align my unconventional 
gender and sexual identity with being outside the national fold. 
 
 
8 
 
As several theorists have noted, gender, nation, and race are 
closely intertwined in public discourse (McClintock 1997; Youval-
Davis, 1997).  One’s own nation state is often figured as feminine 
during wartime; the domestic “home” front belongs to women and 
children, who keep emotional order as men fight abroad.  Allied 
nation states are gendered as feminine, passive victims, so that 
aggressive action against them by enemy states can be figured as a 
“rape” – as in “the rape of Kuwait.”  Such labels whipped up 
emotional support for the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  While an 
enemy nation’s men often represent “the enemy,” moreover, the 
women of that same nation often are represented as needing 
rescue from the men of their society.  One can feel pity or 
responsibility for the women in images of the Other in war, even 
though they still occupy the position of members of an inferior, 
colonizable civilization.  It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
analyze other gendered texts of the war on terrorism.  It is clear, 
however, that the responses to my letter demonstrate a common 
gendered trope regarding colonialism in war, namely, the figuring 
of the imperial nation as a (white) female body vulnerable to 
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penetration by evil.  When a woman on the home front challenges 
the imperial project, she must be figured as something other than 
the real woman/nation.  This hypothesis might explain the sexism 
and sexual charge of many of the responses I received. 
 
9 
 
Many of these responses appeared in the newspaper.  In addition, 
vilification of me preoccupied the conservative web sites 
frontpagemag.com and freerepublic.com.  A local student 
conservative group’s discussion board was full of calls for my head 
and my job.  I was invited to do interviews on right-wing radio, and 
I did speak there.  I heard through the grapevine that I won over a 
listener to the Michael Medved show.  I also responded on the web 
sites, much to the surprise of the freepers (members of the Free 
Republic internet community) and other conservatives, who 
apparently didn’t know they let people like me on those web sites.  
In a published op-ed, I replied to my detractors: 
 
 
10 
 
Ben Franklin wrote that when a nation prioritizes security over 
liberty, the consequences could be dire for democracy.  Contrary to 
my correspondents, I do not believe that order is the ground from 
which all liberty springs.  History teaches quite another lesson – it 
took a civil war, for example, to end slavery.  And “order” is a god 
term not of democratic societies but of fascism.  Unfortunately, I 
believe that in this extremely sensitive time people are all too 
willing to embrace a notion of security – not only against terrorists 
but also against critical ideas and thoughtful dialogue – over 
liberty.  I hope that this set of expanded arguments makes for 
more thinking and fewer personal attacks.  Of course, I hoped to 
provoke a response and I welcome debate and dialogue.  I do not 
feel like a victim and I am not complaining about being criticized.  
However, I hoped to get a real response, not just hate and 
intimidation in the name of freedom.  I encourage activists with 
views similar to mine to come out into the light of day.  The 
urgency of speaking now far outweighs the flak we will get for 
standing up (2002b). 
 
 
11 
 
This controversy points up the ways in which security and affect 
are discursively aligned.  The will to order often arises from an 
emotional state; when one feels that one’s basic security is 
threatened, one is likely to respond out of fear and hatred.  These 
emotions are not the proper basis on which to found a discussion 
of U. S.  foreign policy in a democratic society.  Yet these emotions 
have been the mainstay of both popular and political discourses 
since September 11, 2001. 
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 The Affected Public  
 
12 
 
To describe the work of these discourses, I have coined the term 
“affected public.”  In using the word “affected,” I mean to invoke 
several layers of meaning.  “Affected” can mean addled, as in 
affected or touched in the head.  “Affected” also can mean 
constructed, put on, or artificial, as in an affected accent.  Finally 
“affected” can be used to refer to the influence of emotion or affect 
on a situation.  The affected public demonstrates all three of these 
features:  It is an irrational artificial social construct that 
enforces emotional identification over heterogeneity and dissent.  
An affected public – a public artificially constructed in terms of 
shared affect rather than shared interests or shared reasoning – 
is potentially a distorted and imperiled one. 
 
 
13 
 
I am not arguing that all emotional appeal is necessarily suspect.  
Emotion may be mobilized not only for conservative but also for 
transformative and democratic ends.  Classical scholar Barbara 
Koziak has argued that emotion enables moral perception and 
evaluation and undergirds valued practices such as friendship.  
Working from Aristotle’s writings on emotion, Koziak attempts to 
recover the cognitive and rational features of emotional response 
so that scholars might better distinguish between democratic and 
reasonable uses of emotion from more sinister ones (2000, pp. 14-
15).  While I agree with Koziak that emotion and reason may not 
be neatly severed, I wonder by what criteria one might endorse 
some appeals to emotion over others.  Aristotle claims that one 
should feel anger for the right reason, in the right manner, at the 
right time (Koziak, 2000, p. 82).  But who is to say whose anger is 
just and whose is not?  Given the inevitability of human emotion in 
all political affairs, this judgment can only come from conscious 
alignment with particular groups and their interests.  The 
questions at hand, then, are:  in whose interests are the emotional 
appeals dominant today in U.S. public life; and, to what ends are 
they put?  Today the forces of social stability have far greater 
access to and control over the content of commercial mass media, 
where appeals to fear and national belonging subvert critical 
thinking about war and democracy. 
 
 
14 
 
Left activists and scholars charge conservatives with mobilizing 
unreason in the service of oppression, exploitation, and unjust 
war.  Against an unthinking nationalism, leftist writers offer 
evidence of contradiction between claim and reality:  There are no 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; the United States built up the 
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dictator Charles Taylor in Nigeria, just as it did Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq; the Taliban were once U.S. allies.  To me, this strategy of 
exposing contradiction and offering counter-evidence seems to be 
more than pitting one emotional appeal against another.  Some 
attachments are held in the face of contrary evidence simply out of 
unreasoning blindness.  This warrants an appeal to reason as a 
democratizing impulse.  Appeals to fear enforce order with 
profoundly undemocratic consequences.  It is not simply a matter 
of greater effectiveness by the right wing at this historical moment 
in mobilizing emotion in the public sphere. 
 
15 
 
Both left and right should adhere to a simple ethical standard in 
using emotional appeals.  Emotional exhortations should be 
connected to reasoned cases for action or identification; and these 
should presented in forums that enable dialogue, challenge, and 
deliberation over alternatives.  But in the affected public, there is 
little deliberative space; and exhortations to war substitute 
emotion for the reasoned case, rather than enabling the conjoint 
workings of reason and emotion.  In the affected public, appeals to 
emotion render debate and deliberation unthinkable, as illustrated 
by my experience recounted above.  Emotion is a weapon against 
dissent and grants credence to lies.  As I suggest below, the left 
must use the resources of demystification – which means 
countering emotion with reason – in the process of building a 
counter-hegemonic movement.  Emotion is not irrelevant to that 
project, but neither can it be central if one is to win people to a 
movement for cause rather than faith. 
 
 
16 
 
Robert Hariman and John Lucaites have argued that the “modern 
civic order is based on muted affect – that is, on the containment 
of emotionality, and especially negative emotions, to private life 
and its institutions of family, church, clinic, and television” (2001, 
p. 6).  They suggest that dissent is discredited in the media by 
associating it with emotional display, whereas politics proper is 
conducted under the standards of reason and decorum.  While it is 
true that the ideal of bourgeois civic life as constituted in modern 
times rests upon a Cartesian separation of reason and emotion or 
desire (and attendant suspicion of emotion and desire as 
motivators in the public realm), I must disagree with Hariman and 
Lucaites’ claim that the civic order is, in reality, characterized by 
muted affect.  First, it is impossible to separate television from 
political life and the public sphere in the world today. When 
television evokes and deploys emotional response, it often does so 
in politicized contexts and in a medium that links audience 
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members together in shared meaning and experience. 
 
17 
 
More important, however, is my observation that contemporary 
public life, especially as it is constructed around national identity 
and war, is heavily imbued with legitimated emotion.  The lines 
between public and private here are blurred.  Emotion is 
encouraged and expected in public after experiences of collective 
trauma.  In these instances, absence of emotion is what is rendered 
suspect, not its presence.  The figure of woman is no longer simply 
a private-sphere icon.  On the home front, women become vessels 
of collectivity, of shared caring put into the service of national 
political goals.  Hariman and Lucaites argue that relegating 
emotion to the private sphere, and thereby discrediting “cries of 
protest” “can have anti-democratic consequences” (p. 17).  I believe 
this insight is accurate.  Yet I also think that infusing political life 
with emotional imperatives that silence the voice of reason also 
carries profound anti-democratic potentiality. 
 
 
18 
 
As Hariman and Lucaites note, emotion is a set of intersubjective – 
not psychological or interior – phenomena.  Thus emotions are co-
created in communication, and we can examine how emotions are 
deployed rhetorically to create identification in various social 
spaces.  Emotional expression is treated differentially in public life 
depending on whose expression it is and to what ends its display is 
put.  We should take note of whose emotions are allowed to appear 
without stigma in public and under what circumstances.  
Nationalism may be a special case in which strong emotion – even 
negative emotion such as anger, grief, and hatred – appear most 
legitimately in political contexts. 
 
 
 
 Epideictic as the Form of the Affected Public  
 
19 
 
The affected public is a national sphere that relies on the epideictic 
– discourse of praise and blame, belonging and exclusion, 
ceremony and remembrance.  Rhetoricians have long been aware 
of the power of epideictic discourse, the rhetoric of consolation, 
identification, and social unity around shared values, to bring a 
divided public together.  Recently Gerard Hauser (1999) has 
explored the didactic function of epideictic in laying the ground for 
political action.  Hauser argues against critical scholars who 
bemoan the inherently conservative tendencies in ceremonial 
discourse.  Instead he notes the democratic potential of epideictic.  
Discourses of praise and blame can instruct publics in moral 
rectitude and establish common ground for action, and sometimes 
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epideictic can be a vehicle for controversy and insight. 
 
20 
 
Unlike Hauser, I tend to regard epideictic discourse, as least as it 
happens late in capitalist society, as inimical to or containing of 
krisis, the moment of judgment and action that depends upon its 
cognate, criticism.  When collectives are mobilized for war, 
especially, epideictic warrants a more skeptical approach.  Without 
condemning all epideictic discourse, I would suggest that in such 
situations, it can be profoundly undemocratic, as it rules 
inappropriate and unwelcome anyone offering questions, criticism, 
or a plea for rational thought. 
 
 
21 
 
Today it is impossible to watch television, go to a movie, drive 
down the street, or listen to politicians talk without being sucked 
into the imagined unity of American nationalism.  Images of the 
American flag accompany appeals to grief and fear in a wide range 
of venues.  In the post-9/11 episode of the television program West 
Wing (2001), White House staff engage in therapeutic dialogue 
with visitors from a high school in response to queries about 
terrorism.  At the end of the popular film Spiderman (2002), 
which ostensibly has little to do with current political issues, 
Spiderman lands on an American flag, encouraging a political 
mapping of the mythical Green Goblin onto the rhetoric of the war 
on terrorism.  In 2001 and 2002, my bank issued only check and 
debit cards with an image of the American flag on them.  Despite a 
growing and vocal anti-war movement (most visible in 
Washington, DC on April 20, 2002), there is not much cultural 
space for critical thinking or dissent about the war on terrorism.  
Meanwhile the United States has completed another war on Iraq 
and is engaged in a long-term occupation, itself surrounded by 
discourses of praise and blame. 
 
 
 
 Political Economy of the Affected Public  
 
22 
 
It is not the genre of epideictic by itself, however, that is to blame 
for uncritical nationalism.  The impulse to national unity is a 
product, in part, of the tight-fisted corporate control over the 
media.  Ninety percent of United States media outlets are owned 
and controlled by just four corporate media conglomerates.  Media 
scholar Robert McChesney writes, “The corporate media system, in 
conjunction with the broader trappings of a modern capitalist 
society, necessarily generate a depoliticized society, one where the 
vast majority of people logically put little time or interest into 
social or political affairs” (1999, p. xxxi). 
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23 
 
The influence of corporate media in cultivating depoliticized 
citizens is backed up, as Antonio Gramsci suggested long ago, by 
the power of the state in its crackdown on civil liberties at home 
and abroad.  “You are with us or you are with the terrorists,” Bush 
said, effectively criminalizing dissent and questioning.  The war on 
terrorism has required not only media propaganda but also 
massive witch-hunts, secret detentions, round-ups of thousands of 
Arab and Arab American immigrants and citizens; military 
tribunals; proposals for legalized torture, retinal id cards, and 
internal passports; harassment and discipline of students, 
professors and media reporters who speak out; a new racial 
profiling that has led to attacks and deaths; delay in visa 
processing for thousands of innocent immigrants; and many other 
repressive acts.  The USA Patriot Act allows sweeping anti-
democratic actions, including searches of citizens and non-citizens 
without probable cause, detention of immigrants without hearing, 
email and Internet spying, and tremendous expansion of 
government powers to spy on and prosecute political protesters, 
dissenters, and organizations (Cohn 2002, pp. 19-20). 
 
 
24 
 
Thus the American culture of consolation that gives language to 
the affected public – antagonistic to controversy, history, and 
evidence-based reasoning – is cultivated even more strongly 
during wartime.  I do not mean to blame ordinary people 
themselves, whose grief, shock, and horror on and since 
September 11 are understandable.  Of course, some consolation is 
appropriate under such circumstances.  The cultivation in politics, 
the news media, and popular culture of an addiction to epideictic is 
another matter.  Identification feels good.  It is like a drug. 
 
 
 
 Antidotes to the Affected Public  
 
25 
 
In this context, rhetoricians need to play a detoxifying role.  We 
must pose certain key questions for deliberation about war.  First, 
what are the actual U. S.  motives and goals in this war?  There is 
some evidence that the United States had been pressuring the 
Taliban in Afghanistan long before September 11 to cooperate with 
plans for a new oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea through the 
country.  The world, its people, and its resources are fair game for 
trans-national corporations.  But these corporations still have 
national home bases to which their profits inexorably flow.  When 
a nation-state’s economic or geopolitical interests are threatened 
by an upstart dictator, competing nation states and their interests, 
movements for social justice, or political and economic instability, 
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military intervention often results.  War is the face of globalization 
that reveals it to be little different than the imperialisms of any 
other capitalist period.  But as during the Persian Gulf War, the 
public is not encouraged to think beyond the stated motives of 
vengeance and elimination of terrorism. 
 
26 
 
Second, what are the actual and likely consequences for ordinary 
people of this war?  It is not likely that the war on terrorism will 
end terrorism.  More likely, it will exacerbate the anger and 
despair of Arabs and others in countries affected by the austerity 
required of ordinary people by globalizers, the rain of bombs, the 
cruelty of sanctions, and the support of the U.S. in the Middle East 
for what should be named for what it is:  colonialism and 
apartheid.  In the process of achieving its economic and 
geopolitical aims, the United States has already caused the deaths 
of thousands of innocents, including as many as 3,800 people in 
Afghanistan, according to University of New Hampshire 
economics professor Marc Herold.  As the London Guardian   
reported, “Based on corroborated reports from aid agencies, the 
UN, eyewitnesses, TV stations, newspapers and news agencies 
around the world, Herold estimates that at least 3,767 civilians 
were killed by U.S. bombs between October 7 and December 10.  
That is an average of 62 innocent deaths a day – and an even 
higher figure than the 3,234 now thought to have been killed in 
New York and Washington on September 11” (Milne 2001, p. 16). 
 
 
27 
 
In a widely-discussed article, conservative Sebastian Mallaby 
(2002) suggests that the U.S. need for a stable international scene 
and the failure of aid and development programs such as those 
overseen by the IMF and World Bank warrant a new imperialism 
in which the U.S. should impose its aims by force in every troubled 
nation.  Mallaby argues that the U.S. might benefit by engaging in 
neo-colonial nation building.  The discourse of foreign policy 
makers is clear in its statement of motive, clear in identifying the 
United States as an imperialist power at the center of geopolitics 
today, and clear in defending the right of U.S. to maintain its 
position by force. 
 
 
28 
 
Meanwhile poststructuralist theorists deny the significance of 
United States imperialism altogether.  Hardt and Negri argue in 
their popular book Empire (2000) that economic globalization has 
brought with it a new form of sovereignty.  In the postmodern 
global economy, the important phenomena for scholarly 
examination are not political and economic in nature.  Rather the 
production of social life in culture takes center stage.  Even as the 
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U.S. readies its forces in the Middle East without endorsement 
from the United Nations, Hardt and Negri claim, the sovereignty 
of nation-states has declined.  Rather than posit a critical rational 
sphere, such as the one that can and does develop in oppositional 
social movements, they argue that we ought to celebrate the 
resistance that is already everywhere in the expression of marginal 
subjectivities organized around multitudinous shared 
identifications on the plane of immanence.  Late capitalism is 
“beyond refusal,” they write (p. 204).  It is beyond rational 
intervention. 
 
29 
 
The spectacle of fear that holds together the postmodern, hybrid 
constitution and the media manipulation of the public and politics 
certainly takes the ground away from a struggle over the imperial 
constitution.  It seems as if there is no place left to stand, no weight 
to any possible resistance, but only an implacable machine of 
power.  It is important to recognize the power of the spectacle and 
the impossibility of traditional forms of struggle, but this is not the 
end of the story.  As the old sites and forms of struggle decline, 
new and more powerful ones arise (p. 324). 
 
 
30 
 
But they do not say where, when, or how these new struggles will 
take shape.  They do not say how any can raise voices and fists 
against the falling bombs if they cannot name the United States as 
the center of modern empire any longer.  It is not clear how 
nomadism and miscegenation will disarm the war machine. 
 
 
31 
 
Like wartime propagandists in a therapeutic culture, 
poststructuralist theory too often substitutes identification for 
reasoning, image events for dialogue, and dissemination for 
deliberation as the key terms to describe how persuasion happens 
in late capitalism, replicating the dominance of epideictic over 
deliberation in American public life (DeLuca 1999; Greene 1999).  
These theorists suggest that we resign ourselves to charting a 
hyper-mediated and irrational reality that is not, in any deep sense 
of the word, democratic.  This work may accurately describe 
existing communicative practices in late capitalism.  Yet according 
to such scholarship, the best we can do is to describe the strategies 
at work in public discourse.  Appeals to standards for critical-
rational deliberation are only so much pie-in-the-sky. 
 
 
32 
 
Yet there can and must be other, different, practices.  University of 
Texas professor Jim Fishkin (1991) found in a widely-publicized 
experiment in deliberative polling that, when ordinary people are 
provided with enough information to deliberate and form well-
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reasoned opinions, they do so (Wolf 1996).  As I write in the spring 
of 2003, the anti-war movement is galvanizing the public:  
Millions of U. S. citizens, and 2 billion people around the world 
have demonstrated against the coming war on Iraq.  These events 
are the product of, and offer openings to, critical interventions into 
public discourse by activists and scholars.  Rhetoricians have the 
resources to foster the dissemination of information from multiple 
points of view in public.  In addition, we have the skills of criticism 
to expose propaganda and consolation as inadequate forms of 
discourse in a democracy.  I believe, however, that we cannot limit 
our work to descriptive analysis as our leaders and entertainers 
substitute identification for reasoning. 
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Without a normative ideal of deliberation, such as the one put 
forward by Jürgen Habermas (1989), we cannot have a 
democracy.  For this work, we need the tools of modernist ideology 
critique, including depth hermeneutics.  Depth hermeneutics 
refers to the idea that there are some knowable realities 
underneath ideological discourses and that critics ought to be in 
the business of digging through the dirt to find them (Thompson 
1990, p. 281).  Given that we cannot know those hidden realities 
without understanding them in systems of signification, depth 
hermeneutics can expose and analyze contradictions in the 
answers we find for important questions.  Especially during a war, 
hegemonic rhetorics exhibit the characteristics of propaganda, an 
old-fashioned but useful word for opposition-silencing, agenda-
obscuring texts. 
 
 
34 
 
As noted above,  Koziak (2000) suggests an additional corrective:  
the recovery of political emotion.  Instead of bifurcating reason 
and emotion, she argues, we might do as Aristotle did and see 
utility in the reasonable political uses and expressions of emotion.  
She notes that even for Marx, who privileged rational action based 
on shared interests over irrational national identification, 
alienation is the emotion that “makes plain the inhumanity of 
factory labor” (p. 11).  Some emotional repertoires are better than 
others, according to Koziak, and it is this point that gets 
overlooked in current debates over the role of emotion in political 
life.  There are other political emotions besides patriotic fervor.  
The answer, for Koziak, may not be to trump emotion with reason 
but to find alternatives to what she calls the “reigning emotional 
repertoire” (p. 30).  Thus she concludes her book with an 
endorsement of a feminist ethic of care. 
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who resides in my soul.  Yet I am not sanguine about the 
possibility of mobilizing love – the same emotion that Koziak says 
undergirds patriotic fervor – to rational ends without interpreting 
emotional repertoires from the standpoint of political 
commitments and a rational assessment of our interests and those 
of others.  Thus I believe that we also need a guiding normative 
ideal of critical rationality if we are to challenge the nation’s 
consolation addiction.  On what other basis can we evaluate 
competing emotional regimes?  It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
tell people that what they are feeling is an inadequate basis for 
judgment and action.  The alternative is a perilous relativism. 
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Poststructuralist discourse theory takes what is in the true, in 
other words what is accepted as true, as what must be accepted as 
true in a relativized world.  On this view, there are no truths 
“behind” or “under” the discourses that constitute what counts as 
truth.  Thus there can be no finding out about Conoco’s interest, 
backed by the U.S. government, in an oil pipeline route through 
Afghanistan from the Caspian Sea.  There is no point in 
discovering that the U.S. was planning an intervention in 
Afghanistan months in advance of 9/11.  We cannot count the 
bodies of dead people if they are less than human in the reigning 
imaginary.  We cannot name the war, constructed as a war for 
freedom, as a series of futile atrocities in the interests of oil 
companies.  If Hussein and bin Laden are the dictators du jour, it 
is pointless to point out that the Taliban and Saddam Hussein 
were once friends and beneficiaries of the United States, or that 
there are countless other dictators equally oppressive who have 
been installed and buttressed by U.S. forces. 
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Deliberation includes the capacity to seek out and entertain 
multiple positions on a given event, the capacity to historicize 
events, the capacity to weigh competing evidence and reasoning 
and discard the less credible, the capacity to probe the motivation 
of discourses and adhere to those with the fewest privately 
motivated sponsors, and the capacity to take action based on this 
deliberative process.  When pieces of what is “in the true” 
contradict one another, we must enable students and other 
citizens to decide who most probably is lying. 
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Beyond that task, we have to find venues and media to encourage 
critical thinking among publics at large.  We must also take up and 
re-circulate the counter-hegemonic voices that can and do find 
spaces for dissent in an affected culture.  Any cursory review of 
modern history would show clearly that nationalism does not 
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always trump reason and dissent in the United States or around 
the world.  The very large movement against this recent round of 
wars peaked on February 15, 2002 in world-wide demonstrations 
against war in Iraq.  The movement did not stop the war or the 
occupation, yet it built publics within which counter-discourses 
continue to circulate.  In LaCapra’s (1998) terms, this movement 
inside and outside the academy has the capacity to foster ethical 
remembrance, a kind of working-through-trauma that does not 
reify its terms.  We must disrupt the equations of grief with 
vengeance, war with justice, and dissent with terror.  In a society of 
therapeutic rhetorics, we must take on the counter-hegemonic task 
of rebuilding political publics as the nation goes, once again, to 
war. 
 
 
 
© Dana L. Cloud, 2003. 
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 Appendix:  Pledge for the Workers  
 
 
 
I pledge allegiance to all the ordinary people around 
the world, 
to the laid off Enron workers 
and the WorldCom workers, 
       the maquiladora workers 
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and the sweatshop workers 
      from New York to Indonesia, 
who labor not under God but under the heel 
      of multinational corporations; 
I pledge allegiance to the people of Iraq, 
      Palestine, and Afghanistan, 
and to their struggles to survive and resist 
      slavery to corporate greed, 
brutal wars against their families, 
      and the economic and environmental ruin 
      wrought by global capitalism; 
I pledge allegiance to building a better world 
where human needs are met 
with real liberty, equality, and justice for all. 
                        
 
